Comment
CUBA'S TRANSITION TO A FREE-MARKET
DEMOCRACY: A SURVEY OF REQUIRED
CHANGES TO LAWS AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONSt
MATIAS E TRAVIESO-DIAZ*
STEVEN R. ESCOBAR**

I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment seeks to provide an overview of the primary
changes to Cuba's legal system that will be necessary during the
country's transition to a free-market, democratic society. While
considerable scholarly attention has been given to the changes that
need to be made to Cuba's laws if it is to move to a free-market
society,' the necessary institutional changes have received little
analysis. Institutional changes are extremely important, however,
since laws only come to life if there are legal institutions in place to
enforce and apply the laws, resolve legal disputes, and fill-in the
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1. See, eg., Jorge A. Sanguinetty, The Transition Towards a Market Economy in Cuba:
Its Legal and ManagerialDimensions, in TRANSITION IN CUBA-NEW CHALLENGES FOR U.S.
POLICY 463, 484-88 (Lisandro Perez ed., 1993) [hereinafter TRANSITION INCUBA]; Nestor Cruz,
Legal Issues Raised by the Transition:Cubafrom Marxism to Democracy,199? - 200?, in CUBA
IN TRANSITION-PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 51,54-58 (1992) [hereinafter ASCE-
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details that the laws necessarily must leave open for case-by-case
determination.2
The goal of this Comment is not to provide a detailed prescription for making changes to Cuba's laws and legal institutions3 when
a transition to democracy and a free-market system takes place.4 To
develop such a prescription would require resolution of a fundamental
philosophical issue which is outside the scope of this Comment:
whether Cuba should return to the type of civil law system that
existed there before the 1959 Revolution, or adopt some variant of a
common law system such as the one used in the United States and

2. CHERYL W. GRAY ET AL, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR
DEVELOPMENT INCENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 15 (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 209,
1993). The authors of this study of legal changes in the former socialist nations of Central and
Eastern Europe note that "[a]mong the biggest challenges now facing Central and Eastern
Europe is that of building up the capacity of their judicial institutions to set legal standards,
enforce the myriad of new laws now being adopted, and resolve economic disputes." Id. The
same challenge is expected to be faced during Cuba's transition.
3. It is important to define at the outset what we mean by "laws" and "legal institutions."
These terms are used to connote a variety of meanings, as they are used in different contexts.
This Comment, however, does not seek to address everything that can be regarded as "legal"
or "law-related" in a transition in Cuba; such an inquiry would be far too broad and abstract to
have practical value. We will limit our use of the terms "laws" and "legal institutions" to their
standard meaning in democratic societies.
"Laws" will therefore be used here to mean "rules of action or conduct prescribed by
controlling authority, and having binding legal force." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 795 (5th ed.
1979); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1279 (1986). In Cuba's transition, the "laws" satisfying the above
definition include: (1) a constitution (enacted by a constitutional assembly); (2) statutes,
ordinances, and rules (issued by legislatures); (3) regulations (issued by administrative bodies);
(4) orders, decrees, and edicts (issued by an executive power); and (5) referendum initiatives
(initiated or approved by the People). The set of activities that involve, concern, or relate to
the laws of a country is known as the country's "legal system."
The question of what is a "legal institution" is somewhat more complicated. Traditions,
customs, taboos, and popular practices are often referred to as "institutions." However, in this
Comment we will apply the term institutions to entities, individuals, or groups of persons who
perform tasks relating to the laws or the legal system.
Legal institutions can be either public (governmental) or private (non-governmental). The
public institutions of the legal system include legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions.
The private bar, professional associations, legal service providers, and educational entities are
the principal private legal institutions.
4. It is our belief that those outside Cuba with an interest in the success of Cuba's market
transition can help define the legal changes that will be needed during the transition. Outside
commentators can, among other things: (1) study the issues raised by the transition and
recommend approaches to deal with them through legislation; (2) consult with political scientists
and economists to determine the political and economic needs for legislation, and what features
should be contained in such legislation; and (3) investigate what legal changes have been
instituted in Eastern European and Latin American countries undergoing similar transitions and
what degree of success those changes have enjoyed.
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some other Western countries. Cuba currently has neither; the legal
system in Cuba, as in all socialist nations, is based on the concept of
socialistlegality, under which the legal system is a political instrument
of the government and is used, not to provide predictable rules of
behavior, but to serve as a dynamic agent to further progress toward
the building of socialism.5 Consequently, Cuba's legal system is an
instrument of the Revolution and is obliged at any time to apply the
law in a manner consistent with the then-current interpretation of
revolutionary goals and principles, to which other interests are
subordinated.6 This philosophy permeates the content and interpretation of Cuba's revolutionary laws, as well as the day-to-day practices
of those who are part of the legal system, and will likely provide the
point of departure from which changes to the system must begin.
Reinstatement of the civil system would have the advantage of
building on the legal doctrines that developed in Cuba prior to the
1959 Revolution. It would require, however, the drafting of detailed
codes, which would explicitly define legal norms, but leave relatively
little room for judicial interpretation. A legal system based on a
common law approach, on the other hand, would allow for judicial
interpretation of the laws (and to some degree, risk judicial lawmaking), leading to a more activist role for judges and lawyers.7
Thus, whether a civil or a common law system is chosen during the
transition will have a profound effect on how the entire legal system
ultimately develops.8

5. DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION INTHE BALANCE-LAW AND SOCIETY INCONTEMPORARY CUBA 2 (1994).
6. Id. at 68. As an example of the concept of socialist legality as it applies to the judicial
system, Evenson cites a statement from Jose Santiago Cuba Fernandez upon the opening of the
1959 term of Cuba's supreme court, to the effect that Cuba's revolutionary laws have to be
applied and interpreted in accordance with revolutionary criteria and that "[s]ociety demands
less blindness and more vision of the people, a vision which makes possible that the Revolutionary Law is applied not as a cold norm but as living law dictated by the Revolutionary Power to
serve the people." Id. (quoting JOSE SANTIAGO CUBA FERNANDEZ, MEMORIA LEIDA POR EL
FISCAL DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO (N.D.)).
7. It has been observed that a civil law system elevates certainty in the law "to the.level
of dogma" and creates a static system that impedes social change. EVENSON, supranote 5, at
14 (quotingJOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIvIL LAW TRADITION 48 (1985)). It could be
argued that under the fluid conditions that will likely exist during Cuba's transition, a common
law system would provide greater flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances within the
context of an established set of laws and legal principles.
8. It is not within the scope of this Comment to address the circumstances under which
Cuba's transition to a free-market democracy will take place. The authors assume that the
transition will occur and that it will be orderly enough that laws can be effectively enforced and
the necessary institutional changes can take place uninhibited. It is important to note, however,
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Cuba's transition to a free-market democracy will necessarily
bring about an upheaval in most areas of society, including the legal
system. Many of the laws and legal institutions existing at the start
of the transition will become obsolete or of questionable utility as the
country moves toward a free-market, democratic system.
One of the laws that will need to be changed at the earliest
practicable time is the constitution. Generally, the constitution is the
law that defines the powers and duties of the different branches of
government, establishes the scope and content of some of the
legislation that needs to be enacted, and provides a frame of reference
that lends legitimacy to the government's acts.
A permanent constitution will need to be enacted following a
constitutional convention.'0 Since this process could take up to two
to three years, a constitution most likely will not exist during the early
days of the transition. Due to the importance of the enactment of a
new constitution, the transition of Cuba's legal system can be divided
conceptually into two stages, the "pre-constitution period" and the
"post-constitution period."
The pre-constitution period encompasses the time from the start
of the transition to the time when the new constitution is enacted. If
the market transition proceeds in an orderly fashion, this period
should coincide roughly with the stabilization and transformation
stages of the economic transition." Some of the laws and institutions that must be created in the pre-constitution period will become
permanent; others will be discarded as the temporary need for them
that some analysts believe that this eventuality is not likely to materialize. See, e.g., Jorge I.
Dominguez, The Transition to Somewhere. Cuba in the 1990s, in TRANSITION IN CUBA, supra

note 1, at 5, 35.
9. See Luis P. Salas, The Maintenance of Internal Orderin Cuba: The Administration of
Justice During the Special Period, in TRANsmoN INCUBA, supra note 1, at 237, 257 ("In all
transitions from dictatorial rule to democratic government, the justice sector, especially the
police and courts, have played predominant roles, especially in the early years."). On the other
hand, during revolutions there is a rejection or abandonment of the existing legal system.
Harold J. Berman & Van R. Whiting, Jr., Impressions of Cuban Law, 28 AM. J. CoMp. L. 475,
485 (1980) ("A revolution is a violent rejection of the legal order of the past."). As noted
earlier, the revolutionary government in Cuba dismantled the legal system that existed in the
country prior to 1959.
10. The scholarly debate on whether post-communist Cuba should draft a new constitution,
re-adopt the 1940 Constitution, or combine the 1940 and 1992 constitutions in some fashion is
extensive and ongoing. See SALAS, supra note 9, at 261-62; Sanguinetty, supranote 1, at 481-82;
Dominguez, supra note 8, at 24-25. The authors believe that enactment of a new constitution
that reflects Cuba's contemporary society is essential and inescapable.
11. See discussion infra part II.C concerning the various stages in Cuba's anticipated market
transition.
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disappears. In general, therefore, the changes to the legal system that
occur before authoritative legal principles are established in a
constitution will likely be of a transitory nature and will be modified
or superseded after the constitution is enacted. The post-constitution
period refers to that stage of the market transition following the
enactment of a new constitution, and is expected to extend through
the economic recovery phase of the transition. Most of the changes
to Cuba's laws and institutions during the post-constitution period
should be of a long-term nature, just as in any constitutional
democracy.
This Comment follows the broad division between the preconstitution and post-constitution periods. Part II of this Comment
provides a brief background to the current status of both the legal
system and the economic transition in Cuba, and then undertakes a
conceptual analysis of the anticipated stages in Cuba's transition to a
market economy. Parts III and V examine the required pre-constitutional changes, with Part III focusing on legal institutions and Part V
on laws. In parallel fashion, Parts IV and VI analyze the required
changes to Cuba's legal institutions and laws during the postconstitution period. Finally, Part VII offers several conclusions and
recommendations regarding Cuba's free-market transition.
II. BACKGROUND TO CUBA'S LEGAL SYSTEM AND
ECONOMIC TRANSITION
A. Current Status of Cuba's Legal System
In the first half of Cuba's Revolution--during the period
extending roughly from 1959 to the enactment of the 1976 Constitution-there was a deliberate effort by the Cuban government to
dismantle the legal system, diminish the importance of the courts by
replacing them with ad-hoc people's courts and revolutionary
tribunals, and discourage the study and the practice of law as a
"6parasitic bourgeois profession that would be unnecessary in the 'new
society' .,,12 These policies resulted in "the loss of more than a
generation of skilled jurists, including lawyers, judges and prosecutors.""u It has been only in the last five to ten years, and particularly
since the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, that a significant

12. EvENSON, supra note 5, at 11-13, 41, 65.
13. Id. at 75.
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and increase
effort has been undertaken to upgrade the qualifications
14
the numbers of those involved in the legal system.
This Comment assumes that at the start of the transition there
will be few legal institutions in Cuba capable of supporting the
massive legal changes that will be necessary. This assumption is based
on the precedent established by the transitions in other socialist
countries and on the information provided by those who have visited
Cuba and studied its current legal system."5
For instance, Luis Salas reports that as of 1991 there were only
700 professional judges in Cuba. 6 Law practice in Cuba is constrained not only by the inadequate number and qualifications of the
legal professionals, but also by the judiciary's lack of independence,
the prohibition against the private practice of law, and the expectation
that defense counsel in criminal cases will put the interests of the
State before those of their clients.
The situation is not much better with respect to the laws. Some
of Cuba's laws, such as the Commercial Code, are outdated but could
continue to be used on a stopgap basis until modem legislation is
enacted.' 7 For the most part, however, the laws in effect in Cuba at
this time are both obsolete (in that they do not represent currently
accepted legal and business practices throughout the world) and so
infused with socialist dogma that they would need to be replaced with
suitable legislation at the earliest possible time.'8

14. See id.
15. It is reported that the judiciary of all the former socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe lack adequate training or experience to handle the legal issues that arise in
market economies. GRAY ET AL., supra note 2, at 15. Those who have assessed current
conditions in Cuba provide a similar assessment of Cuba's legal profession. See, e.g., EVENSON,
supra note 5, at 59. Evenson reports, for example, that many of the older jurists in Cuba used
to complain bitterly about the poor quality of Cuba's law school graduates, although they have
high regard for recent graduates. Id. at 56.
16. Salas, supra note 9, at 252. By comparison, Czechoslovakia, a country comparable in
size and population to Cuba, had 1600 judges at the start of its transition to democracy in 1989.
GRAY ET AL., supra note 2, at 63 n.42.

17. Cuba is still using a Commercial Code that dates back to 1885, which was enacted
during the Spanish colonial rule. Michael Bogdan, Thirty Years of Cuban Revolutionary Law,
15 REV. SocIALIsT L. 319, 320 (1989). Although minor amendments have occasionally been
made to it, the Commercial Code is seen as "woefully out of date and must be revised
substantially if it is to serve a modern society." EVENSON, supra note 5, at 205.
18. For example, article 16 of the 1992 Constitution defines the role the state in the
country's economy to be as follows:
The State organizes, directs and controls the country's economic activity in accordance
with a plan that guarantees the programmed development of the country, to the end
of strengthening the socialist system, satisfying in an ever improving way the material
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These shortcomings in the legal system may become serious
obstacles to the progress of the transition. It is clearly not possible to
run a country based on inadequate laws, nor is it practical to enact
laws and regulations at a faster pace than can be assimilated and
enforced by the legal system.' 9 Accordingly, Cuba's transition
government should give high priority to upgrading the legal system so
that it will be capable of keeping up with the pace of economic and
political reforms.
B. Status of the Economic Transition in Cuba
Although the country's leaders are steadfast in their refusal to
institute political changes, Cuba is already undergoing an economic
transition of sorts.' Carmelo Mesa-Lago, a leading Cuban-American economist, calls 1the ongoing economic changes in Cuba "the
This transition involves the institution of
socialist transition."
limited economic reforms dictated by the critical state of the Cuban
economy.' The reforms, however, are seen by many as "ill-advised,

and cultural needs of society and the citizens, promoting the development of the
human character and it dignity, and the progress and safety of the country.
CONSTrrUCION (1992) art. 16 (Cuba). Altogether, more than half of the articles in chapter I of
the 1992 Constitution (on "Political, Social and Economic Foundations of the State") are
devoted to defining a socialist foundation for the Cuban state.
19. See generally John Morison, How to Change Things with Rules, in LAW SOCIETY AND
CHANGE 5 (Steven Livingstone & John Morison eds., 1990).
20. For example, in a June 19,1994 interview with the Spanish daily El Pals,Carlos Lage,
then Secretary of the Executive Committee of Cuba's Council of Ministers, emphasized that
Cuba's problems are only economic and the solutions to them are to be made within the existing
political system. Lage Rejects Multiparty System, Embassy Occupations (Radio Havana Cuba
radio broadcast, June 19, 1994), available in F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-118), June 20, 1994, at 21. At
about the same time, Fidel Castro met with other leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Portugal
at the 1994 Ibero-American Summit; the other leaders reportedly pressed him to implement
democratic reforms, to which he replied that he would not abandon Marxism. Mary Beth
Sheridan & Andres Oppenheimer, Latin Leaders Press Castrofor Reforms, MIAMI HERALD,
June 16, 1994, at 24A.
21. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Social Net in the Two Cuban Transitions,in TRANSrTON IN
CUBA, supra note 1, at 601, 603-04.
22. For a summary of the economic measures taken by the Cuban government in 1993, see
SHAW, PrlTMAN, POTIS & TROWBRIDGE FREE-MARKET CUBA BusINESS JoURNAL, Fall-Winter
1993. More recently, measures have been taken to increase the price of certain articles (e.g.,
cigarettes, fuel, and alcoholic beverages) and services (e.g., electricity, water, and some
transportation services). Canute James, Income Tax for Cubans Next Year, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
9,1994, at 6; Reduction of Excess Currency Noted (Radio Reloj radio broadcast, Cuba, Aug. 24,
1994), translatedin BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, (Part 5: Africa and Latin America),
Aug. 30, 1994. Recently, Cuba's National Assembly approved a proposal to start taxing the
income of individuals and enterprises, with the exception of income from wages and farming
activities. Taxes will also be imposed on real estate, the use of natural resources, and
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insufficient and plagued with inconsistencies."'
The transition's
purpose is to buy time for the current government to enable it to
remain in power with minimum departures from socialism.' The
fact that some of the reforms have recently been curbed or countermanded highlights the leadership's lack of commitment to genuine
reforms. z

advertising. Cuban Lawmakers Approve New Tax System, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 5,
1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NON-US File. Income taxes were previously levied
only on joint ventures and on the self-employed; for example, a July 19, 1994 broadcast by
Radio Progreso announced that the Ciego de Avila Province had collected 12 million pesos in
taxes from self-employed workers. The province was said to be planning to increase the number
of inspectors to collect taxes and enforce the self-employment law. Roundup of Economic
Developments (Havana Radio Progreso Network radio broadcast, July 19, 1994), availablein
F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-140), July 21, 1994, at 7.
23. Rolando H. Castaneda & George P. Montalvan, Transitionin Cuba: Selected Issues, in
CUBA IN TRANSrrION-PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE

ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 11, 13 (1993) [hereinafter ASCE-3].
24. Thus, the Cuban government has repeatedly vowed that Cuba is not going to abandon,
or even substantially change, its socialist economic structure. Carlos Lage, Vice-President of the
Council of State, recently reiterated this point in a January 27, 1995 address at the World
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Lage affirmed, "We don't deceive anyone. We are
not offering our foreign partners a transition to capitalism. Cuba is and will continue to be a
socialist country." Carlos Lage, Speech at the World Economic Forum (1995), reprinted in
GRAMMA INT'L (Havana), Feb. 8, 1995, at 3. Further, Jose Ramon Fernandez, Vice-President
of Cuba's Council of Ministers, recently stated that "despite the difficult economic situation
confronted by the island, the social system chosen by Cubans more than 34 years ago will remain
unchanged .... " Council Vice President on Continuing Socialist Plan, PRENSA LATINA
(Havana), July 28, 1994, availablein F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-147), Aug. 1, 1994, at 7.
25. For example, the legalization of the possession of U.S. dollars and other hard currencies
announced in July 1993 was recently modified to require Cubans to exchange "foreign currency
certificates" in lieu of dollars. These "convertible pesos" are used to pay Cuban citizens who
work for foreign investors or who provide otherwise special services (e.g., tobacco production).
Reform Measures Help to Ease Economic Crisis, LAGNIAPPE LETTER, (Cuba Report), January
10, 1995, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, LAGLTR File. This move is widely seen as, in
effect, overturning the legalization of the dollar. See Carlos Batista, Cuba: A New Currency
Plannedforthis Year, INTER PRES SERVICE, June 24,1994, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library,

WIRES File; Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Outlines List of Possible Reforms, MIAMI HERALD, May
2,1994, at 10A. Also, in May 1994, the Council of State approved Legislative Decree 149, which
authorizes the confiscation of assets of questionable origin. See Castro Vows Corruption
Crackdown Will Kick Off Reforms, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 3, 1994; Pablo Alfonso, Cuba
Aprueba Ley de Confiscaciones, EL NUEVO HERALD (Cuba), May 6,1994, at 1A. Enforcement
of Legislative Decree 149 has been well publicized within Cuba; as of early August 1994, 377
proceedings under this law had been instituted and property valued at millions of pesos, plus
large sums of cash in both pesos and dollars, had been seized. Cuba Says 377 Charged With
Economic Crimes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 3, 1994; see also Legal ProceedingsCommence in
327 'Moneybags' Cases (Radio Reloj Network Radio Broadcast, Cuba, July 6, 1994), available
in F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-130), July 7, 1994, at 8-9; Mimi Whitefield, Hundreds of Cuban 'Money
Hoarders'Hit in Crackdown, MIAMI HERALD, July 8, 1994, at 13A. A likely consequence of
this campaign will be to discourage economic activity by black marketeers, self-employed
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Those who have studied the process in other countries predict
that Cuba's socialist transition is doomed to fail. 6 As the Hungarian
analyst Janos Kornai has pointed out, a socialist system is incapable
of moving away from its rigid economic structure while retaining its
identity.27 Partial reforms in such a system only lead to unsolvable
contradictions, such that no partial alteration of the system can
produce a lasting breakthrough. As long as there is undivided power
of a single party and only one official political and economic ideology,
there can be no true reform and no sustainable economic recovery.2
According to Kornai, the rise of the private sector is the most
important internal development that reveals the contradictions in a
socialist system and ultimately causes its involuntary transition to a
market economy.29 A rise in the private sector is occurring in Cuba,
although private property rights still have not been recognized for
Cuban nationals. The rise in private sector activities includes both a
growing black market "second economy" and recently legalized
private activities in a variety of service sectors.3 In addition, the
government has authorized and is actively seeking joint ventures with
foreign investors, soliciting direct foreign investment, and forming
quasi-independent government enterprises to engage in foreign
trade?1 Also, foreign investment-until very recently restricted to
tourism and areas in the export sector of the economy-is beginning
32
to be authorized in other areas, most notably the sugar industry
and telecommunications.33 Thus, it appears that Cuba's socialist

artisans, service providers, and other small business operators.
26. Se4 eg., Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Will Cuba's Economic Reforms Work?, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 2, 1994, at M1.
27. JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM

xxv (1991).
28. Id. at 377.
29. Id. at 433.
30. See Douglas Farah, Farmers' Markets Help Ease Cuba's Pain, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
1995, at Al; see also Saul Landau, Cuba on its own, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 30, 1992, § Zi, at 8.
31. Other changes now being implemented or contemplated are described in Jose F.
Alonso, Further PotentialEconomic Reforms in Cuba, SHAw, PrriMAN, POTTS & TOWBRIDGE
FREE-MARKET CUBA Bus. J., Fall-Winter 1993, at 6-7; see also Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Outlines
List of Possible Reforms, MIAMI HERALD, May 2, 1994, at 10A.
32. Foreign Investment Helping, Castro Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at D4.
33. In June 1994, Cuba agreed with a Mexican investment company, Grupo Domos, to a
joint venture under which the company would invest over $700 million to overhaul Cuba's
telephone system. 2 CUBA NEWS, July 1994, at 5. Likewise, the agricultural sector (formerly
closed to investors) is beginning to open up to foreign capital. Cuba.: Foreign Investments
Continueto Increase INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 28,1994, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library,
WIRES File.
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transition is slowly, and quite unwillingly,' creating the conditions
for real changes to occur.
This Comment assumes that at some time in the near future this
socialist transition will give way to a true market transition that will
be based on the application of a coherent set of market policies and
will be accompanied by a shift toward democracy in the political
organization of the country. The Comment further assumes that such
changes will need to be carried out through the enactment of a significant amount of legislation.
C. Stages in Cuba's Anticipated Market Transition
Cuba's market transition can be visualized as consisting of three
staggered, overlapping stages.3 At first there will be efforts to stem
the decline in economic activity and avoid further deterioration of
production and standards of living, while at the same time consolidating political power, maintaining law and order, and preparing the
government and the citizens for the actual transition. 6 The primary
goal of the "stabilization phase" of the transition (lasting approximately the first year) is straightforward: to supply both a sufficient
amount of food and adequate levels of health care and other basic
services. During this early phase, the transition government must
seek to achieve political stability and keep the economic conditions
from worsening 7
The second stage of the transition will be a political, economic,
and legal overhaul of the socialist system, which will lay the foundation for Cuba's eventual transformation into a free-market society.
Some of the major permanent legislation will be enacted during this
stage. This second period or "transformation phase" will likely occur
during the second year of the transition, and may continue from that
point into the indefinite future.
The third stage of Cuba's market transition is one of consolidation of the new political and economic systems and reconstruction of
the economy through the development and expansion of industries
and markets. The "consolidation phase" will see the completion of
the overhaul of Cuba's economic and political institutions and will be
34. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
35. Sanguinetty, supranote 1, at 472; see Rolando H. Castaneda, Cuba: CentralElements
of a Stabilization Program and the Initiation of Economy-Wide Structural Reforms, in
TRANSrUON IN CUBA, supra note 1, at 419, 425-34.
36. Castaneda, supra note 35, at 428-29.
37. Id. at 425.
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accompanied by the enactment of many new laws whose implementation may not have been practical or feasible during the earlier stages.
III. PRE-CONSTITUTION PERIOD LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Legislative and Executive Institutions That Need to be
Established During the Pre-Constitution Period
To facilitate a smooth transition from the beginning, there will
need to be official rules to guide the activities of all sectors of society.
The task of the pre-constitution period legislative institutions will be
to generate the necessary rules to meet this need.
1. Transitory Legislative and Executive Institutions. Immediately upon taking control of Cuba, the revolutionary
government began working to centralize the legislative power in the
chief executive, rather than in the legislature. As one commentator
observed:
[T]he Fundamental Law [of 1959] changed the government of Cuba
into a constitutional dictatorship. It replaced the former Chamber
of Representatives and Senate with the president's cabinet, the
Council of Ministers. Under the Fundamental Law, the president's
power was unrestricted. It allowed the president to appoint and
dismiss members of the Council of Ministers at will. The Council of
Ministers was empowered to pass ordinary legislation by a simple
majority vote, and could amend the Fundamental Law by a
two-thirds majority vote. Thus, the president could order the
Council of Ministers to enact any legislation he desired, because he
could dismiss ministers who would not obey and replace them with
those who would?
Upon taking power, the revolutionary government ruled by
executive decree until enactment of the 1976 Constitution, which reestablished a legislative system. To supervise state administration, the
government created municipal, provincial, and national assemblies. 39
Representatives for the municipal assembly were directly elected and
these delegates then elected members of the provincial assembly who

38. William R. Baerg, Note, Judicial Institutionalization of the Revolution: The Legal
Systems of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Cuba, 15 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. 233, 248 (1992) (citations omitted).
39. Marifeli Perez-Stable, Legislative and Electoral Dynamics: Reforms and Options, in
TRANSITION IN CUBA, supra note 1, at 39,43.
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in turn selected members of the National Assembly of People's Power
(National Assembly).' However, the National Assembly, the singlechamber legislature created by the 1976 Constitution, is not a true
legislative body and suffers from a "rubber-stamp image."'"
Meeting briefly twice a year, the National Assembly had more
formal and symbolic purposes... . The way the agenda was
worded ... revealed the nature of the debate: discussion and
approval of the items at hand. Debate sometimes modified but
never rejected proposals.... [O]nce Fidel Castro spoke definitively on an issue, discussion was over 4
Similarly, local assemblies failed to fulfill a representative role. "They
did not.., bestow upon the population the opportunity-let alone
the power-to discuss and decide matters of substance. Involvement-not substantive participation-was the key characteristic of
Popular Power at the local level."'43
The 1992 Amendment to the 1976 Constitution provides for the
election by direct popular vote to the National Assembly and the
provincial assemblies. 4' This change, however, is a far cry from what
is needed to make Cuba's current legislature a suitable vehicle for a
transition to democracy. The candidates for election to the National
Assembly are selected by national and provincial candidacy commissions. Not only are other official candidates not allowed, but the
people can vote only for the candidates selected by the commissions.
In addition, the assemblymen are part-time non-professionals without
a staff, who convene only twice a year for just four or five days at a
time, and meet essentially to sign off on measures already approved
by the Communist party and the Council of State.4' A National
Assembly operating on that basis will be unable to implement a
transition of the type that Cuba needs as it simply will not have the
power to control the transition.

40. Id.
41. See Gillian Gunn, Prospectsfor Change in Cuba, in TRANSITION INCUBA, supra note
1, at 67, 73.
42. Perez-Stable, supra note 39, at 44.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 48.
45. EVENSON, supra note 5, at 28.
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Most likely, the transition government will dissolve the National
The initial legislative institution during the
Assembly. 6
pre-constitution period will be the executive power in control of the
government, be it a council, junta, individual chief executive, or some
other kind of governing body. In the case of Cuba's transition, as in
the case of any government that does not have a duly elected
legislature, new legislation must emanate from the executive institution that is in control. It will be incumbent on this executive body to
issue the decrees and laws that are required to lend order to the
transition during the pre-constitution period.47 The executive's role
in developing legislation during this period will ultimately be assumed
by a permanent legislature, which presumably will be elected at the
same time as the country's new executive.48
2. Permanent Executive Institutions. Executive agencies,
ministries, and departments must be created or reorganized during the
pre-constitution period to carry out and administer the executive's
decrees. Cuba currently has a system of weak, limited-power
ministries and agencies. As chief executive, Fidel Castro "conducts
the general policy of the state, organizes and conducts the work of the
Government, controls the activities of the ministries and proposes the
appointment or replacement of ministers. He can also at any time
assume the leadership of any ministry or central agency .... ,,49
During the transition and beyond, executive power needs to be
decentralized and agencies and ministries need to assume increased
responsibility and a meaningful share of executive power, including,
but not limited to, rule-making authority. Some agencies (such as
those overseeing the workings of the government in order to prevent
mismanagement and corruption) must in fact be fully independent and
46. See Sanguinetty, supra note 1, at 496 n.40 ("[T]his author believes that a transitional
government firmly committed to a liberalization process would dissolve [the National Assembly]
ipso facto."). Were the National Assembly to be retained during the early phase of the
transition, it would need to be reconstituted and transformed into a true full-time legislature
invested with real powers.
47. The executive body will probably need assistance in drafting some of this legislation.
Such assistance may come from existing government agencies, as well as from governmental and
non-governmental committees and advisory panels appointed by the executive to help with
specific tasks.
48. For purposes of this Comment, we assume that the first executive of the transition
period will be succeeded relatively quickly by another one chosen by the people in free
elections. For a discussion of how multiparty elections might proceed in a post-communist Cuba,
see Perez-Stable, supra note 39, at 60-61.
49. Bogdan, supra note 17, at 326.
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protected from the executive power in order to discharge their duties
effectively.
It follows that in order for these actions to be constructive, law
enforcement agencies will have to be capable of applying the decrees
and legislation that will be forthcoming during the pre-constitution
period. Cuba, like other Hispanic countries, maintains an independent agency comprised of prosecutors, which is known as the
50 Cuba's fiscales perform traditional prosecutorial tasks and
fiscalia.
are also expected to supervise "the legality of official acts generally."5' Like the Soviet procuracy,5 the fiscalia "may not compel an
agency or an organization to change its practices but may only protest
illegalities to superior agencies or organizations (unless the practices
constitute crimes, in which case thefiscaliamay also institute criminal
'
proceedings)."53
Salas reports that in 1991, the approximately 850
prosecutors who constitute thefiscaliaappeared insufficient to handle
the case
load, prompting the Fiscal to request an additional 120
54
slots.
In addition to the reported shortage of prosecutors, other
problems plague the traditional prosecutorial system. In particular,
the expertise and professionalism of the fiscales need to improve."
Doubts have also been raised about the effectiveness of Cuba's
fiscalia in dealing with government officials' compliance with the law.
On paper, and in theory, the fiscalia, like the Soviet procuracy, is
a powerful corrective to official illegality-the most powerful
corrective that exists within the formal legal system. However the
experience of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, all of which
adopted the Soviet institution of the procuracy, with its power of
"general supervision," has revealed wide variations in the practical
effectiveness of that institution in different countries and at
different times.56
It will be necessary to train a sufficient number of fiscales during
the pre-constitution period to enforce the laws against private citizens
50. Salas, supra note 9, at 255.
51. Berman & Whiting, supra note 9, at 480.

52. The Soviet procuracy was an organization that investigated the activities of official
agencies to detect illegal practices and to follow up complaints about official wrongdoing. Id.
53. Id.
54. Salas, supra note 9, at 255 (citations omitted).
55. See EvENsoN, supra note 5, at 81 (this applies with greatest force to those operating
at the provincial and municipal levels).
56. Berman & Whiting, supra note 9, at 480-81.
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in a manner consistent with the laws and due process guarantees in
effect at that time. Time may show that the fiscales are not the best
tool to use, but the question of whether the fiscalia or some other
government instrumentality should perform the general governmental
oversight function can best be resolved in the post-constitution period,
once the fiscalia has had the opportunity to demonstrate whether or
not it is capable of performing such a difficult and sensitive task.
Along with prosecutors, public defenders will also be needed
from the start of the pre-constitution period to represent indigent
defendants in actions brought against them by the State. Although
Cuba currently provides public defenders to individuals accused of
crimes,57 in order to be effective the system must undergo drastic
changes. Serious doubts exist regarding the public defenders'
willingness to adequately represent their clients. In its 1987 report on
Cuban prisons, Amnesty International concluded that "[]awyers
appear to be just auxiliaries and ancillaries in this process rather than
clearly defending the interests of their client.""8 Any system of
public defenders in a post-communist Cuba must be operated in a way
that comports with democratic notions of fairness towards the
accused, and the interests of defendants must be vigorously advocated
by counsel. The establishment and enforcement of ethical rules for the
conduct of attorneys-a task which, because of other priorities, may
not be undertaken before the initiation of the post-constitution
59
period-would be an important step toward that goal.
Other law enforcement agencies, such as the police forces, will
also play an important role in the implementation of laws. The

57. Id. at 482 ("There is a right to counsel in criminal cases; indeed counsel is required in
all cases where the accused is charged with a crime punishable by a sentence of more than nine
months.").
58. Quoted in Salas, supra note 9, at n.138; see also Baerg, supra note 38, at 268 ("Cuban
lawyers are not expected to defend the interests of their client .... ). The shortcomings of the
public defenders' efforts in criminal trials were highlighted by the well-publicized trial of General
Arnaldo Ochoa for his part in the drug trafficking scandal of 1989. This incident gave many
observers the impression that defense counsel was ineffective and passive. EVENSON, supranote
5, at 48-49. However, the law and regulations instituted in 1984 governing the practice of law
emphasize the independence of lawyers and the lawyers' obligation to defend the clients' interest
with maximum diligence. Id. at 48.
59. Cuba already has a code of ethics for attorneys, enacted by the Ministry of Justice via
Resolution 142 of December 1984. See Paul Bernstein, Cuba: Last Look at anAlternative Legal
System?, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 191,198 (1993); EVENsON, supranote 5, at 47. However,
the concerns expressed by international organizations and commentators regarding the lack of
adequate representation of clients in Cuba today give reason to believe that the existing code
will need to be substantially upgraded and enforced.
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reform of these institutions will thus be a crucial, if difficult, task of
the transition period. Currently, Cuba's public order forces operate
within the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and are divided into
three groups, each under a separate vice-minister: the internal order
forces (policemen, firefighters, and corrections personnel); the security
forces (counter-intelligence and state security); and the intelligence
forces (foreign intelligence). 6° In addition, in 1991 the Cuban
government created the Servicio Unico de Vigilancia y Proteccion
(Unified Vigilance and Protection System or SUVP). The SUVP
recruits from non-governmental entities and the population at large;
its purposes are to combat crime, suppress anti-revolutionary
activities,
and perform other security functions at a grass-roots
6
level. '
The probability of unrest and violence during the transition
makes it necessary that adequate internal order forces, particularly the
police, be available to ensure domestic tranquility. One of the
greatest challenges facing the transition government during the preconstitution period will be to retrain and enlarge the roster of internal
order personnel and ensure that these personnel are capable of
maintaining law and order while exercising proper respect for due
process and individuals' rights. The somewhat less daunting task of
permanently reorganizing the internal order forces could be deferred
until the inception of the post-constitutional period.
While police forces will be important to the transition, they are,
presently vested with too much power to be effective. The security
and intelligence organizations that comprise the balance of the
MININT personnel, as well as the SUVP and other para-military
organizations, should be disbanded at the start of the transition, and
their members disarmed. Indeed the very existence of these groups
would threaten the survival of the transition and would be intolerable
to many citizens.62 Although Cuba will have a continuing need for
some form of domestic intelligence capability, such a need is not
urgent and can eventually be addressed by the permanent government.
During the transition, it is important that wide dissemination be
given to the new laws and decrees so that Cubans may attain
sufficient knowledge to understand the government's actions. An

60. Salas, supra note 9, at 245.
61. Id. at 24749.
62. See generally id. at 245-51, 257-61.
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effective means of notification of official actions is also essential to
the protection of the citizens' due process rights. Thus the system of
legal publications will also prove to be an important instrument in the
transition.
For many years Cuba has had an official government publication,
the Gaceta Oficial (analogous to the Federal Register in the United
States), where decrees and laws are published. Currently, however,
most laws are not being published separately from the Gaceta Oficial,
nor are they collected in volumes by subject. For a number of years,
and particularly since the onset of the current economic crisis, the
measures being considered by the government have been discussed at
various mass organizations prior to enactment, and then explained at
great length in the media by Fidel Castro, Carlos Lage, and other top
government officials. While such discussions are certainly not
indicative of a democratic rule (nor a substitute for it), they are
effective in informing the population about the new laws and
conveying the government's position on what the laws accomplish and
why they are necessary.
The success of the transition will hinge on the Cuban public's
reaction to the actions taken, and its acceptance or rejection of
proposed measures. Therefore, the officials of the transition government should make every effort to use publications, as well as the mass
communication media, to inform and educate the public with regard
to transition issues. As Jorge Sanguinetty has observed:
Many underestimate the power of public education. Others ignore
the existence of a large body of material and methods that can be
applied to raising the public understanding on the economic and
legal aspects of policy reform in a democratic setting. Those who
propose a radical transformation of the Cuban society with the
democratic participation of the Cuban people should make an effort
to understand the importance of public education in this immense
endeavor. It was an indispensable tool for the current regime and
it would be equally effective in the transition.'
B. Judicial Institutions that Need to be Established During the PreConstitution Period
Because there will necessarily be vast changes in the law during
the transition, and the transition itself will give rise to innumerable

63. Sanguinetty, supra note 1, at 483-84.
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legal issues, there will also be an immediate need for institutions that
can adjudicate rights and settle legal disputes. Currently, the judiciary
in Cuba is an adjunct to the executive and has little independent
power.' During the transition it will be necessary to enact laws
reorganizing the judiciary and rendering it independent of the
executive and legislative branches, establishing new courts, and
instituting an expeditious process for the appointment of new judges
and other personnel involved in the administration of justice, while
retraining existing judicial personnel.
1. Transitory Judicial Institutions. Many legal actions can be
The growing
expected to be initiated during the transition.'
caseload may require that temporary judicial institutions be deployed
during the pre-constitution period to handle some of the more
frequently litigated matters. For example, special courts should be
instituted for handling routine legal proceedings (e.g., debt collection
cases) and adjudicating property ownership disputes where either the
amount in controversy is below a certain limit or the dispute involves
residential property.66 General principles for handling such claims
could be provided by policy-level legislation, leaving the details to a
case-by-case resolution by the courts. 67
The transition government will also need to create special
criminal courts for the expeditious adjudication of complaints against
individuals who may have committed human rights violations during

64. In the 1976 Constitution the courts were declared subordinate to the National
Assembly. CONSTrrUCION (1976) art. 122 (Cuba); Max Azicri, Change and Institutionalization
in the Revolutionary Process: The Cuban Legal System in the 1970s, 6 REv. SocIALST L., Mar.
1980, at 164, 167. Azieri writes:
The broad jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers was expanded even further when the
judiciary was also placed under its control. This structural change put an end to the
possibility of an independent judiciary which could pursue a course of judicial action
and decision-making different than, or opposed to, official revolutionary policies.
Id. Article 121 of the 1992 .Constitution declares that the courts are subordinate to both the
National Assembly of People's Power and to the Council of State. CONSTrruCION (1992) art.
121 (Cuba).
65. It has been reported that in 1991 alone, 700,000 new lawsuits were filed in Hungary and
121,000 in Czechoslovakia. GRAY Er AL, supra note 2, at 58, 86. Unless extraordinary
measures are taken to expedite judicial proceedings, Cuba could experience a similar surge in
litigation during the transition, with attendant delays in the resolution of cases.
66. The resolution of. claims arising from the expropriation of property during the
Revolution will perhaps be the among the most vexing problems of the transition. For a brief
discussion of laws that will be needed to address expropriation claims, see infra Part V.B.4.
67. For an illustration of what a law dealing with specific property issues might look like,
see Julio Romanach, Jr., En Torno al Proyecto de Ley de Viviendas Urbanas y Rurales, in
ASCE-2, supra note 1, at 93.
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the current regime. It would be prudent, in any event, to segregate
these highly politicized trials from the ordinary types of criminal
matters, although the same due process rights should be available in
both types of cases.6
2. PennanentJudicialInstitutions. While it is clear that some
temporary judicial institutions will be necessary, most of the judicial
institutions that need to be established during the pre-constitution
period will be of a permanent nature. Of principal importance are
the national, provincial, and local court systems. These institutions
will be the arbiters of public and private civil disputes, and of criminal
prosecutions.
Cuba currently has a unified national court system consisting of
three levels. At the highest level is the People's Supreme Court,
which is divided into six different chambers: (1) criminal, (2) civil and
administrative, (3) labor, (4) state security, (5) military, and
(6) economic.

69

The supreme court oversees the operation of the

entire court system, but the role of the court is limited due to its
inability to review the constitutionality of actions taken by the
executive and legislative branches." The next level of courts is the
People's Provincial Courts, one of which is located in each of the
fourteen provinces. The provincial courts have initial jurisdiction over
crimes with potential sentences of one to eight years and serve as
courts of appeal for the third and lowest layer of courts, the People's
Municipal Courts.7 ' The 169 municipal courts are the principal trial
courts in the Cuban judicial system and have initial jurisdiction over
civil and minor criminal matters.72 In the early phase of Cuba's
transition, the existing court system will need to be supplemented and

68. Great care should be taken, however, to avoid imitating the experience of the
revolutionary courts that were established in 1959 to try former officials of the Batista regime
for their crimes and later used against alleged enemies of the government. The revolutionary
courts were military tribunals which used summary procedures and granted little due process
protection to the defendants.
69. Ley de Organizacion del Poder Judicial, Law No. 1250, published June 23, 1973. This
law was amended first by the Ley de Organizacion del Sistema Judicial, Law No. 4, published
August 25, 1977, and subsequently by the Ley Sobre los Tribunales Populares, Law No. 70,
published July 24, 1990. The Economic Chambers of the Supreme Court and the Provincial
Courts were established by Legislative Decree 129, De Extincion del Sistema de Arbitraje
Estatal, published August 19, 1991.
70. Salas, supra note 9, at 251.
71. Id.
72. Id.

398

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:379

73
modified, but its basic structure need not be altered substantially.
It contains, at least in principle, the framework for a functioning
system. Long-term court reform will undoubtedly be needed but
would be better addressed in the new constitution and implementing
legislation enacted during the post-constitution period.
The main focus during the pre-constitution period should be on
the individuals who staff the court system. In particular, the
pre-constitution period should be devoted to training and commissioning a sufficient number of competent judges and court adjuncts, such
as magistrates, masters, and marshals, to effectively operate the
system.74 If Cuba's judicial institutions are to establish their authority in the long-term, they must strive for credibility during the
pre-constitution period. At the same time it is important to recognize
that the success of the individuals who make up the court system will
in large part be dictated by the appropriateness of the decrees and
laws they are asked to enforce.

C. Permanent Non-Governmental Law-Related Institutions that
Need to be Established During the Pre-Constitution Period
In addition to the courts and other public legal institutions, Cuba
will need private individuals and organizations that can operate within
the legal system. Indications from those who have recently visited
Cuba are that there are inadequate numbers of lawyers, law schools,
and other legal service providers, and that those that do exist are illprepared for the tasks they must undertake in a free-market,
democratic legal system." Given the great demands and stresses
that will be placed on the Cuban justice system during the transition,
it is essential that viable non-governmental law-related institutions be
developed from the outset.
1. Professionalsand ProfessionalOrganizations. At the present
time there are no independent law practitioners in Cuba. Under a
1973 law that reorganized the judicial system, all attorneys wishing to

73. Among the new permanent courts that will need to be established as early in the
transition as possible are special tribunals with jurisdiction over areas of the law requiring
unique expertise such as bankruptcy, intellectual property, and antitrust.
74. Cuba now uses lay judges who serve alongside professional judges at all levels of the
judicial system, including within the Supreme Court. EVENSON, supra note 5, at 75-77. Lay
judges should eventually be eliminated, but may need to be retained during the early phase of
the transition to compensate for the shortage of trained judges.
75. See EVENSON, supra note 5, at 59.
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engage in private practice must join bufetes colectivos de abogados
(collective lawfirms), defined as "autonomous institutions under the
supervision of the Ministry of Justice.. 76 "Attorneys, henceforth,...
either work for state enterprises, government offices, teaching law
school, or on the staff of one of the many bufetes colectivos established throughout the country; in the latter, attorneys... charge legal
fees, officially set by the government, for their services."7 7 The
bufetes colectivos handle large numbers of cases annually, most of
which involve divorce and probate proceedings.7'
The training currently provided by Cuban law schools will most
likely be inadequate for the practice of law in a post-transition
Cuba.7 9 It is also not clear that the experience of Cuban lawyers,
both within and outside of the bufetes colectivos, will have prepared
them to practice in a free-market society. Cuban advocates in the
bufetes colectivos, for instance, deal primarily with criminal and family
law in contrast to the work of pre-revolutionary advocates who often
specialized in areas such as business law and tax law. 0
The only legal practitioners who have acquired experience that
could be relevant in a free-market economy are those working as legal
advisors at ministries, state agencies, and commercial enterprises.
These attorneys give legal advice to the enterprises that employ them,
assist in the negotiation and drafting of contracts, and provide other
services of the type provided by in-house counsel to corporations in
industrialized nations. Legal advisors, however, are "almost universally criticized for lack of preparation and skill. 81
After many years of little or no growth the number of lawyers in
Cuba appears to be increasing. As of 1982, there were only 5,600
persons out of Cuba's total population of ten million who had law
82
degrees "and many of these did not even work in the field of law."
Evenson reports that in 1988 there were 3,500 students enrolled in the
four existing Cuban law schools (Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Villa
Clara, and Camaguey).Y However, only a relatively small number
76. Bogdan, supra note 17, at 324.
77. Azicri, supra note 64, at 168 (citation omitted).
78. Salas, supranote 9, at 256.
79. EVENSON, supra note 5, at 59. Reforms to the legal education system were instituted
in 1982-83, and further reforms were scheduled for 1990-91 but were not implemented. Id. at
55-56.
80. Bogdan, supra note 17, at 325.
81. EVENSON, supra note 5, at 54.
82. Bogdan, supra note 17, at 322 (citation omitted).
83. EVENSON, supra note 5, at 56.
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of lawyers are practicing in 250 bufetes colectivos nationwide. 4
Consequently, it is unclear how many of the rest of the Cuban law
school graduates are currently practicing law.
During the pre-constitution period high priority must be given to
creating new law schools and other legal training institutions,
reshaping law school curricula, and helping reestablish the private
practice of law. Law students and lawyers will have to be trained in
disciplines that have application in free-market systems including but
not limited to: contracts, corporate law, labor law, tax, bankruptcy,
commercial transactions, banking, real estate, intellectual property,
antitrust, and litigation.' Private firms will also need to be established so that legal representation will be available to individuals and
entities in their private and public transactions. Finally, one issue
calling for early resolution will be whether attorneys licensed in other
countries will be allowed to practice in Cuba, and if so under what
conditions.
There will also be a place in a post-revolutionary Cuba for public,
86
court-sponsored alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods.
The anticipated court backlogs during the pre-constitution period will
possibly encourage parties to resort voluntarily to ADR techniques to
avoid the potential for protracted litigation in the national court
system. ADR methods, which include arbitration, mediation,
conciliation, mini-trials, and other tools, could be used in Cuba to
resolve commercial disputes between private parties or between such
parties and government agencies.' Successful use of ADR methods
84. Salas, supra note 9, at 256.
85. For an example of revolutionary period law school curricula see John Carro, The
Structure of Legal Education and the Practice of Law in Cuba, 25 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PUERTORRIQUENO 89, 118-21 (1985-86).
86. Until 1991, Cuba had an arbitration system to resolve disputes between state
enterprises. See Enrique Dahl & Alejandro M. Garro, Cuba's System of International
CommercialArbitration.A Convergence ofSoviet and LatinAmerican Trends, 15 LAw. AM. 441
(1984). This system was entrusted to the Organo de Arbitraje Estatal (State Arbitration
Agency), an agency which resolved inter-enterprise contractual disputes, promulgated economic
regulations, and provided consultation and advice to enterprises and national economic planning
units. EVENSON, supranote 5, at 206. The inter-enterprise arbitration system was abolished in
1990 and replaced in 1991 with the newly created economic chambers in the supreme court and
the provincial courts. Id. at 210. Cuba also currently has a non-governmental form of foreign
trade arbitration. See Bogdan, supranote 17, at 324; see also Bernstein, supra note 59, at 202
("Arbitration continues to play an important role in resolving disputes arising from the growing
presence of joint ventures with foreign partners ... ." (citation omitted)).
87. For a summary discussion of current trends in ADR methods and the circumstances in
which ADR may or may not be advisable, see Campbell Killefer, Some Disputes Still Deserve
Their Day in Court WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1992, at A10; see also, Campbell Killefer, Alternative
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would instill confidence in foreign investors that their rights could be
meaningfully asserted and protected. During the pre-constitution
period, therefore, the transition government should declare in the
Civil Procedure Code or in a separate statute that any determinations
(e.g., arbitration awards) that result from ADR proceedings are
legally binding and enforceable. The government should also define
the methods for enforcing such determinations.
2. Other Legal Service Providers. Finally, Cuba will need a
number of other legal service providers during the pre-constitution
period in order for its legal system to operate effectively. Indeed,
without these individuals the legal machinery will grind to a halt.
Court reporters, court clerks, and notaries are among the necessary
participants in a transition legal system. New educational institutions,
or special programs at existing institutions, will need to be developed
to train such individuals, although the establishment of such programs
should have lower priority than creating programs for training judges,
court adjuncts, and attorneys.
IV. POST-CONSTITUTION PERIOD LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
The post-constitution period will mark the most critical stage in
the process of altering Cuba's legal institutions. While many changes
will be made before the new constitution is enacted, the expectations
of the Cuban people, as well as those of the international community,
will likely be highest during the post-constitution period.
As discussed above, the pre-constitution period will probably
involve governance from the top down, through decrees issued by the
executive.
The post-constitution period will provide the first
opportunity in the transition for democratic principles to be put into
practice. Thus, Cubans, along with the rest of the world, will be
watching to see whether the new Cuban government respects and
abides by the constitution and implements a rule of law. Because the
stakes will be so much higher, it is essential that the overhaul of the
legal institutions be successfully completed during this period.

Dispute Resolution-ADR Among Technology Vendors and Customers, 11 SHAW, PrrIMAN,
Pomrs & TROWBRIDGE TEcHL L. NoTES 1-3 (1994).
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A.. Legislative and Executive Institutions That Need to be
Established in the Post-Constitution Period
As Cuba moves toward implementing the system of governance
defined in its new constitution, attention must focus on developing the
particulars of how the-country's legislative and executive institutions
will function. For these new institutions to succeed, great care must
be paid to defining the details of their structure and the electoral
process itself While the powers of the legislative and executive
branches of government will be defined in the new constitution, other
permanent institutions will also need to be established, either by the
constitution or by separate legislation.
It will be the task of the framers of the permanent constitution
to decide on the form, composition, term of service, and electoral
system of the national and provincial legislatures." Whatever their
structure, the post-constitution legislative institutions should have
their members chosen through free elections that allow a multiplicity
of political parties and a diversity of political positions. The legislatures must also be granted all necessary powers to propose, consider,
debate, and enact legislation. These institutions must be truly
independent of the executive branch and must be accountable to the
people through the electorate's power to recall legislators whose
performance is unsatisfactory.
As discussed above, the chief executive of the current Cuban
government plays an excessive and over-intrusive role in the
legislative process. Because the centralization of legislative power in
the executive branch is inconsistent with the functioning of a
free-market, democratic system, it should not be extended beyond the
initial period of the transition.
Accordingly, the constitution will probably place considerable
limits on the legislative powers of the executive branch. Nevertheless,
the chief executive, along with his cabinet and advisers, should
continue to be a major source of legislative proposals. The executive
branch should also retain its traditional, limited law-making and
rule-making responsibilities, such as the negotiation of agreements
with other countries, the issuance of executive decrees implementing

88. One question that will certainly be debated is whether Cuba should retain the current
unicameral structure of the national legislature or should revert to the bicameral system that
existed prior to the 1959 Revolution and which was copied from the U.S. model. See EVENSON,
supra note 5, at 9.
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existing laws, and the development of detailed regulations through its
administrative agencies or departments. Exercise of these law-making
functions should be subject to review by the courts and to modification by the legislature.
The constitution will probably declare the right of the Cuban
people to exercise a limited but crucial legislative role through the
referendum process. The constitution (which itself will most likely be
ratified by popular referendum) should also provide that constitutional amendments and legislation to modify or redistribute the powers
of the branches of government will be put to a public referendum.
B. Judicial Institutions that Need to be Established During the PostConstitution Period
1. Permanent Judicial Institutions. As discussed in Part III
above, enactment of the constitution should provide the opportunity
for the initiation of comprehensive long-term court reforms. It is at
this time that the government should delineate the jurisdictions of the
various courts, define court procedures and rules of practice, and
establish the processes for selecting, promoting, and removing the
members of the judiciary. Also, after the constitution is enacted, the
government should address any needed changes in the structure of the
judicial system.
One structural change that should take place is the permanent
establishment of courts of limited jurisdiction to handle specialized
matters. A constitutional court, for example, should be created to
review the validity of acts by the executive or the legislature under
the constitution. 9 Civil service and military courts may be required
to hear cases arising in the context of those public services. Tax
courts with jurisdiction over the interpretation of the tax codes will
need to be established. Administrative courts should be set-up to
adjudicate disputes between private parties and executive agencies or
departments. In addition, bankruptcy, intellectual property, and
antitrust courts should be created if they have not already been
established during the pre-constitution period.
Local courts of limited jurisdiction will also need to be established if they are not already functioning. These could include, for

89. The judicial review function has been implemented in the former socialist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe through the establishment of separate constitutional courts. GRAY
ET AL, supra note 2, at 2-3.

404

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:379

example, police and traffic courts, probate courts, family courts, and
juvenile courts.
The post-constitution period will also be the proper time to
develop a full complement of court adjuncts. National, provincial,
and local courts will need personnel, in addition to judges and their
staffs, who are trained to assist the courts in the judicial process.
Although court adjunct positions may start to be filled during the
pre-constitution period, the training programs initiated early in the
transition should graduate increasing numbers of individuals capable
of performing these functions during the post-constitution period.
Some of these training programs may be abbreviated. For
example, magistrates and masters can be lay personnel who are
trained in particular areas of the law and referees can be trained to
receive evidence in fields in which they have technical expertise.
Commissioners, sheriffs, and marshals can be deployed with a
minimum of training to assist in the administrative details of the
judicial system, such as service of process, execution of judgments,
and the like.
At the same time that the government redefines the role of
courts and the training of legal personnel, it can seize the opportunity
to redefine how disputes are settled. To reduce the demands on the
courts and to expedite conflict resolutions, the government should
create viable alternatives to litigation.
ADR methods such as arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and
mim-trials should achieve widespread use in civil litigation in the postconstitution period. As court referrals and supervision become more
frequent, alternative methods of resolving disputes will likely be
favored because they will save both courts' and parties' resources
during a time when they are at their scarcest. By sanctioning and even
ordering the use of such mechanisms, courts will reassure parties that
resort to non-judicial determinations are a binding and efficient way
of resolving disputes in Cuba.
2. Non-Governmental Law-Related Institutions. During the
post-constitution period, legal professionals and other legal personnel
will likely band together in voluntary or mandatory organizations of
individuals engaged in similar specialties. Cuba currently has two
non-governmental legal professional organizations: Union Nacional
de Juristas Cubanos (the National Union of Cuban Jurists or NUCJ)
and Organizacion Nacional de Bufetes Colectivos (the National
Organization of Lawyers' Collectives or, ONBC). Approximately
eighty-five percent of Cuba's jurists belong to the UNJC, which
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functions as a national bar association. 90 The UNJC's membership
includes lawyers from the collectives, legal advisors, judges, prosecutors, law professors, and notaries.9'
Salas reports that in 1984 there were approximately 700 members
in the ONBC.
The ONBC is an autonomous, self-sustaining
institution that regulates the conduct of lawyers practicing in bufetes
colectivos, administers the code of ethics that governs their activities,
and imposes penalties on lawyers who violate ethical standards. 3
The ONBC carries out a number of other activities, such as sponsoring conferences on legal issues and establishing commissions to make
legislative proposals for the government's consideration.94
These existing professional associations, particularly the UNJC,
could be preserved during the transition. However, in order for them
to play a meaningful role in a post-transition environment, they must
focus on furthering the professional development of their members
and establishing and enforcing standards of practice. Membership
should be open to all members of the bar and the organizations
should not impose restrictions on the free flow of information and
ideas in the programs they sponsor.
For the legal system to operate effectively during the post-constitution period, the Cuban legal community will need access to a
number of basic legal services. Principal among such services are
those that provide legal information, such as legal research organizations (especially computer-assisted research), legal periodicals, and law
text publishing companies.' A range of other providers of legal
services, from notaries to tax return preparation organizations, will
also be needed during this phase of the transition. The marketplace
will likely provide effective mechanisms for the appearance of these
legal service providers when there is a pressing need for their services.

90. EVENSON, supra note 5, at 58.
91. Id.
92. Salas, supranote 9, at 256 & n.131.
93. Id.
94. EVENSON, supra note 5, at 51.
95. The current Cuban legal system has been characterized by a shortage of legal materials
and information:
During the first two decades after the revolution, there was a striking paucity of Cuban
books dealing with legal issues. There was practically no foreign legal literature
available, with the exception of a few Soviet books published in Spanish in Moscow...
* The scientific legal journal of the National Union of Cuban Jurists, the Revista
Cubanade Derecho, has been appearing since 1972, but during the first fifteen years
of its existence only 27 issues were published ...
Bogdan, supranote 17, at 322.
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V. LAWS THAT NEED TO BE ENACTED DURING THE
PRE-CONSTITUTION PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION
A. Introduction
A number of analysts have examined the legal changes that will
need to be instituted during Cuba's transition to a free-market society.16 Most of these analysts do not seek to differentiate between
the legal changes that will be required in the early stages of the
process and those that will be appropriate when the transition has
progressed towards the recovery phase and a new constitution has
been enacted. The discussion that follows will attempt to identify
which of the legal changes must be made early and which can be-or
need to be-deferred until the later stages of the transition.'
B. Transitory Laws
Certain changes in the laws must be made during the preconstitution period of Cuba's market transition. These include
temporary measures such as provisional constitutional statutes, laws
to maintain public order and stability, public welfare provisions, and
legislation to execute the initial economic changes of the transition.
Certain high-priority permanent laws will also need to be enacted
during the same time frame.
1. Constitutional Acts. One crucial change that needs to be
made at the earliest possible time is the establishment of a constitutional framework for the transition. Some analysts advocate following
Cuba's 1940 Constitution, the last constitution enacted prior to Cuba's
1959 Revolution, which some believe is still in effect. 98 However,
even those who support the framework established by the 1940
Constitution recognize that many provisions of that constitution would
be inappropriate for a post-transition Cuba. Thus, a leading
proponent of the 1940 constitutional framework recognizes that some

96. See, eg., Cruz, supranote 1; Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Stephan M. Bleisteiner, Some
Lessons for Cuba from the Legal Changes in Eastern Europe, Address at the Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge Cuba Business Seminar (April 27, 1993) (transcript available in Shaw,
Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge's Library, Washington, D.C.).
97. Of course, making such a division is somewhat arbitrary and the vagaries of the
transition process may require significant departures from any prescribed formulas.
98. Jose D. Acosta, El Marco Juridico-Institucionalde un Gobierno Provisionalde Unidad
Nacionalen Cuba, in ASCE-2, supra note 1, at 61, 78.
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of the constitution's provisions would be inapplicable; he cites as an
example article 15 which declares that Cuban citizenship is lost by
those who become citizens of another country. Were that provision
to be put into effect after a transition in Cuba, it would deny Cuban
citizenship to many hundreds of thousands of Cuban nationals who
left the country after the Revolution and who have since become
citizens of other countries.99 In fact, the 1940 Constitution contains
a number of provisions that would hinder the transition, such as its
interventionist policies in the sugar industry (e.g., article 275), its
expansive labor rules (e.g., articles 60 through 85), and its restrictions
on the ability of foreign nationals to own land (e.g., article 90).
On the other hand, the current constitution, which was enacted
in 1992, and its predecessor, the 1976 Constitution, are on the whole
unsuitable documents which-for both political and legal reasons-would not provide a good foundation on which to base a
market transition. Were the 1992 Constitution to be retained, it
would need to be amended immediately to remove all socialist dogma,
reinstate private property rights, and expressly guarantee private
ownership of property and its protection from expropriation without
compensation.' °
The form and content of a constitution are important topics for
debate. Legal scholars, political scientists, and other commentators
may differ, for example, on what topics need to be addressed in a
constitution, and what the appropriate level of detail in those
discussions should be.'01 These issues and others attendant to the
enactment of a constitution should not be decided at the start of the
transition, when it is likely that the affairs of the nation will be
unsettled and the country's leadership preoccupied with keeping the
country together.
A better practice would be for the transition government to issue
one or more "constitutional acts"-a series of statutes that replace,
over a short period, the latest socialist constitution and provide
guidance until the enactment of a permanent constitution."° Such
acts would provide the legal framework for the transition until a
constitutional convention could be assembled and a new constitution
enacted. These statutes would not pretend to be a comprehensive
99. Id at 82.
100. See Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 96, at 5-10.
101. Cuba's 1940 Constitution encompassed 286 articles and dealt in varying detail with a

broad range of subjects; the U.S. Constitution, by contrast, has only seven Articles.
102. The constitutional acts would be repealed by the new constitution.
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permanent constitution. Rather, they would merely serve as shortterm "super-laws" resting on the emergency powers of the provisional
government, not on the constitutional powers of the people. Similar
constitutional acts have been used in Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria pending the enactment of new
constitutions in those countries.'0
The constitutional acts promulgated by Cuba's transition government might contain, for example: (1) a proclamation of the existence
of three separate and independent branches of government (the
executive branch, the legislature, and the judiciary); (2) a declaration
of the human, economic, social, and political rights of all juridical
persons; (3) a definition of the process for establishing a democratic
government through free, general elections; (4) a prescription of the
process and timing for assembling a constitutional convention and
enacting a permanent constitution; (5) an enumeration of the powers
of the provincial and local governments and their relation to those of
the central government; (6) provisions for the initial restructuring of
the judiciary; and (7) a broad identification of the tasks that the
transition government must accomplish and a vesting of power in
existing or newly created agencies to accomplish those tasks. 4 For
example, the constitutional acts might ordain the establishment of a
Central Bank to regulate currency and banking transactions, leaving
the development of a detailed charter for the Bank to other legislation.
The constitutional documents that guide the transition must also
address fundamental issues such as reinstituting the rule of law,
guaranteeing property rights, and declaring the country's adherence
to free-market principles, while at the same time expressing a
commitment to some form of social safety net.
2. Public Safety and Order Statutes. A top priority for the
transition administration will be to keep peace and maintain public
order, for in the absence of internal peace a successful transition will
become difficult, if not impossible. If the economic situation is grave
and the government does not have either the strength or the appropri-

103. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 96, at 6-9; see also GRAY E

AL.,

supra note

2, at 24.

104. For an example of the types of provision that could be included in the Constitutional
Acts, see ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN, CONsTrrrUION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA-A PROPOSED

DRAFr 22-23 (Endowment for Cuban Am. Studies, Cuban Am. Nat. Found, The Cuba Paper
Series, 1993).
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ate institutions and mechanisms to maintain order, lawlessness,
05 Criminal laws deter such lawlessincluding looting, may result."
ness by providing appropriate sanctions for anti-social behavior, while
at the same time preserving individual due process rights.
Legislation must also be enacted during the early phase of the
transition to reorganize and scale down the armed forces, bolster the
effectiveness of the police, dissolve all paramilitary groups, and take
control of the vast arsenal of weapons now in the hands of individuals. Likewise, laws will need to be issued defining the benefits to be
provided to members of the armed forces who retire or are discharged
through the down-sizing of the country's military establishment.
Legislation will also be needed defining the actions to be taken
against former government officials for criminal acts they may have
committed while in office.
3. Public Welfare Measures. The governments of virtually all
countries that have made the transition from socialism to a freemarket system have been besieged by popular demands for the
preservation of the extensive social "safety net" that had been
previously provided to the population at little or no cost. 1 ' Cuba
has developed probably the most extensive safety net of any socialist
country." Even today, as the economy crumbles and Cubans face
increased hardship in every aspect of their lives, Cuba's top government leaders point to free education, free health care, and other social
benefits as the key accomplishments of the Revolution."

105. Sanguinetty, supra note 10, at 471.
106. In response to these demands, most Central and Eastern European countries have
included express commitments to some form of safety net in their constitutions. For example,
Romania and Bulgaria declare in their constitutions the citizens' right to free education and
medical care. GRAY ET AL, supra note 2, at 2.
107. Mesa-Lago points out that at the beginning of the 1990s Cuba had the most comprehensive and costly "social safety net" in the socialist world and in Latin America. Mesa-Lago, supra
note 20, at 604.
108. Thus, in a June 30,1994 address to the National Family Doctor Congress, Fidel Castro
stated that despite other changes that had to be made during the current economic crisis,
"[t]here are two sacred things, two sacred achievements that should be maintained at all costs
and under any circumstances, just as we developed and created them-the right to health and
to education." Castro on Protection of Family Doctor Program (Havana Radio Rebelde
Network broadcast, June 30, 1994), available in F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-127), July 1, 1994, at 3.
However, there are strong indications that Cuba's safety net is unraveling as a result of the
country's economic crisis. Medical supplies are scant, medications are frequently unavailable,
and even aspirin is now rationed. See Health Care for Cubans May Be Free, But Drugs Are
Running Shor Associated Press, June 29, 1994; Roman Orozco, Journalist Views "Desperate"
Situation, CAMBIo (Madrid), June 27,1994, at 44-47; Christopher Marquis, Cuba's Health Care
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The transition government in Cuba will be faced with the difficult
task of balancing the need to revitalize the country's economy with
the likely demand for the continuation of benefits such as free
education and health care. Thus, among the first pieces of legislation
that must be enacted during the transition is one that defines the
extent to which free public education will continue to be provided.
Likewise, public health statutes will need to be drafted early to
delineate which government-funded medical services will continue to
be made available, and at what cost.
Guaranteeing an adequate supply of food to the population is yet
another essential task that the transition government in Cuba must
accomplish from the start. Laws to encourage the production of food
and to ensure the efficient and equitable distribution of food among
the population 'must be at the top of the agenda of Cuba's transition
government.
4. Economic Reform Legislation. As in other former socialist
countries, it will be necessary to establish economic legality in Cuba
through an unambiguous declaration of adherence to free-market
principles and the enunciation of a clear and sufficient set of
economic rules.1" Accordingly, legislation that supports economic
legality within a free-market context must be enacted early in the
transition.
The principal temporary laws that will need to be enacted during
the early phase of Cuba's market transition in order to support
economic reforms include: (1) a constitutional declaration of property
rights; (2) legislation to initiate the privatization process; and (3) laws
dealing at a general level with the property claims issue. Additional
laws and decrees must be enacted to implement the economic reforms
themselves.
It is important to discuss briefly one of the necessary changes in
the economic framework: the issuance of legislation that deals at a
policy level with property expropriation claims and outlines the
privatization process. The constitutional acts mentioned above should
System, Once Exemplary, Is Now Collapsing,MIAMI HERALD, June 22,1994, at IA. In the area
of education, starting with the 1994-95 academic year, there will be an end to the free lunches
offered in the country's schools and the stipends the government used to provide to college
students will be replaced with loans. In addition, entrance fees will be charged at cultural
events, museums and galleries, and sporting events and facilities. Cuba Will Begin to Chargefor
Items, Services that Used to be Free MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 1994, at 18A.
109. See generallyJohn M. Litwack, Legality and MarketReform in Soviet-Type Economies,
5 J. EcoN. PERsP., Fall 1991, at 77.
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create a Privatization Agency to manage the return of state-owned
enterprises to the private sector and a Claims Agency to resolve
expropriation claims."' Separate statutes could flesh out the mandates and procedures of those agencies.
If Cuba follows the same path as other countries that have
undergone a transition from socialism, final resolution of the
expropriation claims may not be accomplished for a long time."'
Resolution of such claims will be complicated by the passage of time
and by the fact that much of what was expropriated has been moved,
destroyed, modified, or merged with other property."2 Furthermore, the government has made investments that have added to or
modified the existing assets."'
While the claims themselves may not be resolved for awhile, a
quick decision needs to be made on how title to property in Cuba is
to be settled. This is because some areas of the economy must be
privatized right away-particularly those providing essential services
that the State may not be in a position to furnish effectively.
Privatization of these activities may be set back too long if the title
issues are not resolved quickly."4 The societal and opportunity
costs of protracted litigation over title to property must also be
avoided by all available means.
It may be that the transition government will need to reaffirm the
revolutionary expropriations for the limited purpose of asserting the
State's title to the properties, so that the government agencies can
dispose of them without first having to resolve conflicting claims to
title. While such a reaffirmation might be contested, it could obviate

110. See, e.g., Sergio G. Roca, Cuban Privatizatiorn PotentialPath and Implementation, in
TRANSITION IN CUBA, supra note 1, at 567, 583-86; Julio Romanach, Jr., Privatizacionde la
PropiedadMercantil e Industrial en la Cuba Post Castro: Un Modelo de Implementacion, in
ASCE-3, supra note 23, at 257, 257.
111. GRAY Er AL., supranote 2, at 3; Rudi Dornbusch, GettingReady for Cuba After Castro,
Bus. WK., May 24, 1993, at 19.
112. This is particularly true of industrial and commercial assets such as machinery and
equipment.
113. Sanguinetty, supra note 10, at 479-80.
114. Castaneda & Montalvan, supra note 23, at 24-25. All the countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that have implemented restitution schemes based on former owners' assertion
of title to confiscated property (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, and Romania)
have experienced a great deal of uncertainty over property rights. This uncertainty has
discouraged potential investors and has delayed privatization efforts. GRAY ET AL, supranote
2, at 3-6.
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protracted
litigation over the legal effectiveness of the expropria115
tions.
Cuba's claims situation is even more complicated than that of
other former socialist countries because Cuba has a huge backlog of
unresolved U.S. citizen expropriation claims. Although conceptually
the claims of Cuban nationals should be handled in a non-discriminatory fashion and in a similar time frame as those by U.S. citizens, the
international relations aspects of the U.S. claims may dictate that they
receive different treatment, particularly if the U.S. government
continues to insist (as it has to date) on the resolution of the U.S.
expropriation claims as a pre-condition to the normalization of
relations between the United States and Cuba. To the extent that
there is restitution of confiscated properties, the restitution award
should require that the assets be put to productive use and not laid
aside for potential sale to third parties or to await better economic
conditions.
Some of the expropriated assets may have been turned over to
non-U.S. investors, who may have been exploiting them. A transition
government would have to weigh the country's economic interest in
leaving undisturbed the existing arrangements with regard to those
assets, against the legal interests of the former owners, be they Cuban
or American. As the socialist transition unfolds and more state
properties are committed to joint venture arrangements, this problem
will become more serious and widespread.
A.R.M. Ritter suggests that the best overall approach to the
claims issue would be a hybrid scheme encompassing partial compensation, partial restitution, vouchers, rights in joint ventures with the

115. It has been argued that the expropriations carried out by the Cuban government in the
early years of the Revolution were legally ineffective. See; eg., Gregorio Escagedo, Jr., Posibles
Problemas que Confrontaremos en Cuba: Sus Soluciones, in ASCE-3, supra note 23, at 250.
Others, on the other hand, assert that under international law principles Cuba's expropriations
(at least those involving assets of foreign nationals) were legally effective, although there is an
issue as to whether the compensation afforded the owners was "prompt, adequate and effective,"
as required under international law. A.R.M. Ritter, FinancialAspects of Normalizing Cuba's
InternationalRelations: The Debt and CompensationIssues, in TRANSITION INCUBA, supranote
1, at 501, 537-41. The question involves a variety of domestic Cuban law and international law
considerations. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and PracticalIssues in the Resolution
of Cuban Nationals' ExpropriationClaims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L 217 (1995)
(containing an analysis of the issues to be considered in resolving the expropriation claims of
Cuban nationals); cf. Juan C. Consuegra-Barquin, Cuba's Residential Property Ownership
Dilemma: A Human Rights Issue Under InternationalLaw, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 873 (1994)
(containing an analysis of the issue in the context of the potential resolution of claims to title
to residential property in Cuba).
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government, and partial forgiveness. He proposes that ad-hoc, caseby-case negotiations be used to resolve the most significant claims." 6
Whatever methods are adopted, they must be as fair to all parties as
possible, and must treat Cuban nationals in roughly the same manner
as they do U.S. claimants.
C. High Priority Permanent Laws
Cuba will be in immediate need of permanent laws to implement
reconstruction of the country, foster trade with other
economic
the
nations, and encourage foreign investment. Areas of legal change
that need to be addressed as early in the transition as possible include
at a minimum the following codes and statutes:
1. Bankruptcy Code
2. Companies Act
3. Foreign Investment Act
4. Intellectual Property Protection Codes
5. Labor Code
6. Tax Codes
7. Trade Regulation and Anti-Monopolies Codes
A relatively straightforward example of a permanent law that
needs to be enacted on a high priority basis is a Foreign Investment
Act. Every country in Central and Eastern Europe that has made the
transition from socialism to a free-market economy has enacted such
a statute, which is primarily intended to encourage foreign investment." 7 As a starting point legislatures usually use whatever laws
are in existence before the transition which dealt with joint ventures
with foreign investors, and then modify those existing laws to
eliminate restrictions on investment by foreign nationals."8
116. Ritter, supra note 115, at 559-60.
117. See, e.g., Bulgaria's Law on the Economic Activity of Foreign Persons and on the
Protection of Foreign Investments (January 16,1992), published in State Gazette No. 8 of 1992;
Hungary's Act XXIV of 1988, published in 2 HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE, (1991);
Poland's Law on Companies with Foreign Participation (June 14, 1991), reprinted in POLAND:
THE NEW BuSINEss FRONTMIER (1991); Romania's Law Concerning Foreign Investments, Law
No. 35 of 1991, as amended by Law No. 57 of July 10, 1993.
One of the first countries in Central and Eastern Europe to enact a Foreign Investment Law
was Czechoslovakia, which did so in 1988. Act on the Enterprise with Foreign Property
Participation, Act. 173 of 1988, as amended by Act 122 of April 19, 1990. In 1992, however,
Czechoslovakia essentially abrogated its foreign investment legislation by merging it into the
Commercial Code. As a result, foreign investors have neither limitations nor incentives to invest
in the Czech Republic or Slovakia and are treated the same as domestic investors. GRAY ET
AL, supra note 2, at 52, 55.
118. Cuba has developed a framework for foreign investment in the form of Legislative
Decree No. 50. Sobre asociacion economica entre entidades Cubanas y extranjeras [On
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A typical foreign investment law addresses four main subjects: (1)
the definition of foreign investor; (2) allowable forms and areas of
investment; (3) investors' rights and guarantees; and (4) incentives for
investment. 9 The law usually includes the elimination of restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic companies, the removal of
almost all prior-approval requirements for foreign investment, the
guarantee of full compensation in the event of expropriation, the right
to full repatriation of profits, and the creation of special tax incentives.' 2°
First of all, the Foreign Investment Act must define "foreign
investors" under the law. The Act must specify whether Cuban
nationals living abroad will be considered foreigners and determine
whether Cuban expatriates who have become citizens of another
country will be characterized as foreign investors. Because the
purpose of a foreign investment law is to encourage the maximum
inflow of foreign-based capital, its definition of who is considered a

Economic Association Between Cuba and Foreign Entities], Decree No. 50, GACETA OFFICIAL,
February 15, 1982, at 11, translated in Cuba: Legislative Decree on Economic Association
Between Cuba and Foreign Entities,21 I.L.M. 1106 (1982). This decree has been the basis for
Cuba's aggressive pursuit of joint ventures with foreign investors for the purposes of expanding
exports and promoting international tourism. See EXECUTIVE COMMTTEE OF CUBA'S COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS, POSSIBIL Y OF JOINT VENTURES IN CUBA (1991). Based on this legislation,

over 150 joint ventures have been undertaken with entrepreneurs from Europe and Latin
America. See Cuba: Foreign Investments Continue to Increase, Inter Press Service, June 28
1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, WIRES File.
Legislative Decree No. 50 could be used in the early days of the transition as a vehicle for
foreign investment in Cuba. It is, however, "full of ambiguities that would leave foreign
investors unsure of their rights and at the mercy of arbitrary actions by the government."
Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 96, at 23 (quoting JORGE PEREZ-LOPpz, THE 1982
CUBAN JOINT VENTURE LAW: CONTEXT ASSESSMENT AND PROSPECTS 73-78 (1985)). This
decree and the rules for foreign investment will need to be totally overhauled or replaced at the
earliest possible time. See Jorge Perez-Lopez, Cuba's Thrust to Attract Foreign Investment- A
Special LaborRegime for Joint Ventures in InternationalTourism, 24 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 221,277 (Winter 1992-93). As of this writing, a new foreign investment law
is under development by the Cuban Government.
119. For example, the Romanian Law Concerning Foreign Investments, supra,note 117, is
organized as follows: chapter I, "General Provisions" (including the definitions of foreign
investment, foreign investor, and participation of foreign investors in Romania, and a definition
of the areas where foreign investment is allowed); chapter II, "Guarantees" (setting forth the
rights of foreign investors, and guarantees against expropriation without compensation); chapter
III "Incentives" (containing reductions of duties and taxes); chapter IV, "Promotion and
Registration of Foreign Investments;" chapter V, "Financial, Foreign Currency and Commercial
Operations;" and chapter VI, "Final Provisions."
120. GRAY Er AL., supra note 2, at 8.
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foreign citizen should be as inclusive and flexible as possible.' On
the other hand, a law that grants broad privileges to Cuban expatriates could lead to resentment by people on the island."z
The Act also needs to explain the types of business organizations
that foreign investors may use to operate in Cuba. Central and
Eastern European countries now allow foreign investors to use all
forms of organization recognized by local law.' In order to follow
this practice, Cuba would need to enact a modern Companies Law to
open the country's doors to the wide variety of investment entities
that are used in today's business world.
Another goal of the Foreign Investment Act will be to delineate
the types of business activities that foreign investors can undertake.
Typically, almost all areas of the economy are open to foreign
investors without need for pre-approval by the government."
There are three areas where foreign investment is often subject to
government approval or prohibited altogether: (1) an activity having
national security implications such as the production or sale of
weapons; (2) the exploitation of natural resources; and (3) the
ownership of agricultural land. For Cuba, the first type of limitation
is reasonable, but the other two would exclude foreign investors from
access to a large portion of the economy. Any restrictions on foreign
investment in those areas will have to be weighed carefully."2
121. Bulgaria's foreign investment law has dealt with this question by declaring that
Bulgarian citizens living abroad are not foreign investors for purposes of the law. Bulgarians who
have acquired dual citizenship have the right to elect whether they want to be treated as
nationals or foreigners for purposes of the law. Id. at 34-35.
122. One serious political issue that Cuba's transition government will need to face is the
fear and animosity of people in Cuba against "carpetbaggers" coming from the United States
to take over the country. This fear appears to be shared by many Cubans and is fanned by the
current Cuban government. See Jose L. Pujol, Turmoil in Cuba, Address at the Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge Workshop on Strategies for the First Year of Cuba's Transition 10-11
(January 27, 1994) (transcript available in Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge's Library,
Washington D.C.). It will need to be taken into account in all legislation that addresses the
legal, economic, and political rights of Cuban expatriates.
123. For example, corporations, limited liability companies, and partnerships.
124. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 96, at 20; GRAY Er AL, supranote 2, at 8.
125. Cuba has recently entered into several joint ventures with foreign investors for the
exploration and extraction of oil, nickel, and other minerals. See, eg., Cuba Has First Offshore
Oil Find;More Wells on Tap, OIL & GAS J., June 13,1994, at 40; Larry Luxner, U.S. Embargo
Aids Canadian Ventures-Cuba Also Offers Virgin Resources Without Red Tape, TORONTO
STAR, May 3, 1994, at C1. These foreign investments in the exploitation of Cuba's mineral
resources create a strong precedent for allowing continued foreign participation in this crucial
area of the country's economy.
The prohibition against foreigners owning land, particularly agricultural land, stems from
the fear of foreign takeover of the national patrimony and the attendant loss of sovereignty. In
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Additionally, the Act should provide foreign investors with
specific assurances against loss or lack of liquidity in investments.
Foreign investment laws typically replicate the constitutional
guarantee against uncompensated expropriation of foreign assets,
declare that the expropriation of the property of foreign investors can
only occur in cases of important public need, and assert that such
expropriation should be subject to adequate compensation. 6 These
laws also normally authorize the full repatriation of foreign investment profits and other investment proceeds, including those resulting
from the liquidation of the investment."2 Cuba's Foreign Investment Act will need to provide similar assurances, which in any event
will need to be included in any bilateral trade agreements between
Cuba and other countries as a prerequisite to normalization of
commercial relations."2
the case of Cuba, this concern has historic roots. Prior to the 1959 Revolution much of the
country's agricultural land was owned by U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals, particularly
in connection with the sugar industry. Thus, when the United States set up a process under P.L.
88-666 in 1964 to allow U.S. nationals to file claims before the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC) for the expropriation of their assets in Cuba, 6 of the 10 largest claims
certified by the FCSC were to U.S. companies that owned sugar mills and plantation in Cuba.
Ritter, supra note 115, at 533.
126. For example, article 5 of the Romanian Law Concerning Foreign Investments, supra
note 117, states:
The foreign investments in Romania shall not be nationalized, expropriated,
requisitioned or subject to other measures with similar effects, except in cases of public
interest, with observance of the legal procedures set forth by the law and upon
payment of a compensation equivalent to the value of the affected investments, which
shall be prompt, adequate and appropriate.
127. For example, article 9 of the Romanian Law Concerning Foreign Investments, supra
note 117 gives foreign investors the right to transfer abroad "their entire annual profits" (after
payment of taxes); "the sums collected for copyrights, technical assistance, expertise and other
services;" "the sums obtained from the sale of shares, partnership rights, bonds or other
securities, as well as the proceeds from liquidation of investments;" and "the sums received as
compensation in the event of one of the occurrences set forth in Article 5 hereinabove."
128. The United States will probably attempt to enter into a bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) with Cuba, as it has done with a number of other developing countries. See Jeswald W.
Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of BilateralInvestment Treatiesand TheirImpact on Foreign
Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655, 657-58 (1990). Such a treaty would
establish explicit legal norms to protect future U.S. investments in Cuba and ensure that U.S.
investors are protected against expropriation and enjoy the right to transfer the profits and
proceeds of investment out of Cuba in hard currency and without interference by the Cuban
government. Kristina Smith, Note, Investing in Democracy: Joint Venture Opportunities in the
Czech and Slovak FederalRepublic 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 199, 214-15 (1992).
Cuba has recently entered into BIT-type agreements with Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain
and Spain. See Spanish Official Views Results (Mexico City NOTIMEX broadcast, May 28,
1994), available in F.B.LS. (LAT-94-104), May 31, 1994, at 13-14; Delegates Begin Talks
(Havana Radio Havana Network broadcast, May 27,1994), availablein F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-104),
May 31,1994, at 13. The most recent agreements, which were negotiated with Spain and Great
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Finally, the Act needs to offer foreign investors a set of incentives that will encourage participation in Cuba's economic transition.
Most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have developed
a package of incentives to make investment in their countries more
attractive to foreign capital and to compensate for the risks of investing in a country undergoing an economic and political transition.
These incentives take the form of reduced tax rates, tax holidays for
periods of up to several years, tax-free "free trade zones," customs
duty exemptions on imports used for export-targeted production, and
other similar measures. 129
There is no question that Cuba will be in dire need of foreign
investment during the transition and that it should undertake all
reasonable steps to encourage such investment." The difficulty lies
in assessing how much in the way of incentives foreign investors will
require before they decide to invest capital in Cuban enterprises.'
It would seem, in light of the Cuban transition government's
potentially dire need for revenue, that tax incentives to foreign
investors should be limited in extent and duration and should be
focused on those areas of the economy where the injection of foreign
working capital is essential, such as in high technology industries3 that
2
cannot be expected to be developed solely with local resources.

Britain and are still pending ratification by the Spanish and British legislatures, contain
assurances of protection to investors from those nations against actions by the Cuban authorities
that would result in the loss of the investment or its proceeds.
129. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 96 at 25-28.
130. See Jorge A. Sanguinetty, Monetary Dualism as an Instrument Towards a Market
Economy. The Cuban Case 2 (paper submitted at the Annual Meeting of the American
Economic Association, Boston, January 2-5, 1994 and at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami, August 11-13,1994) ("[T]he speed of
[Cuba's] economic restriction depends on the level of investment activity that can be achieved
in Cuba, which at the same time depends on the volume of capital inflows that can be attracted
to the country.").
131. It has been argued that incentives such as tax holidays do little to actually stimulate
foreign investment, cause adverse domestic consequences because they discriminate against
national investors, and lead to significant loss of government revenues. GRAY ET AL, supra
note 2, at 8. (As noted earlier, Czechoslovakia eliminated tax incentives for foreign investors
after offering them for three years.)
132. Hungary, for example, offers foreigners tax incentives that are industry-specific and
dependant on the size of the investments. Favored industries include electronics, car parts,
machinery, engineering units, pharmaceuticals, packaging technology, agricultural and food
technology, energy conservation, telecommunications, tourism, and public transportation.
Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 96 at 25-27; Francis A. Gabor, The Quest for
Transformationof to a Market Economy: Privatizationand ForeignInvestment in Hungary, 24
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 269,298-300 (1991); GRAY Er AL., supra note 2, at 79-80 & n.53. A
similar list could be developed for Cuba based on existing conditions at the time of the
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The above discussion shows how enactment of even a relatively
straightforward law promoting the economic transformation of Cuba
involves a host of political, legal, and economic considerations that
call for careful analysis and a comprehensive approach to economic
legislation.
VI. LAWS THAT NEED TO BE ENACTED DURING THE
POST-CONSTITUTION PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION
The laws that need to be enacted during the post-constitution
period of the transition include those necessary to implement
economic reforms and those that provide a permanent legal framework for a free-market in Cuba. The laws enacted during this period
should build upon, supplement, and in some instances supersede,
those enacted in the earlier pre-constitution stage.
A. Laws Needed to Implement Economic Reforms
The legal changes needed to support economic measures depend
to a large degree on the economic programs that are being implemented. Economists are generally divided between those favoring a
big bang-a set of drastic reforms instituted all at once' 33 -and
those advocating a more gradual approach with a minimum package
of essential reforms." Christopher Clague defines such a minimum
package of reforms to encompass taking measures to restore
macroeconomic balance to the economy, setting rules for the
operation of the new private sector, implementing price reforms, and
restructuring the state sector.15

transition.
133. An example of this is the "shock therapy" approach adopted by Poland, which included
simultaneous institution of a broad range of economic reforms, including the elimination of price
controls, the elimination of subsidies to state-owned enterprises, the devaluation of the currency,
the lowering or elimination of trade barriers, the enactment of a privatization law, and the
provision of legal and financial incentives to the private sector. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Learning
from Others: Economic Reform Experiences in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and China, in
TRANSITION IN CUBA, supra note 1, at 367, 393 (quoting Jeffrey Sachs, Poland'sBig Bang: A

FirstReport Card,5 INT'L ECON. 40 (1991)).
134. For a summary of different views espoused in relation to Cuba's transition, see Rolando
H. Castaneda, Cuba: Una Opcion por la Libertad, el Desarrolloy la Paz Social (Propuestade
Lineamientos Estrategicospara la Completa Transformacion de la Economia Socialista a una
Economia Social de Mercado), in CUBA IN TRANsITION-PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCATmON FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 257

(1991).
135. Christopher Clague, The Journey to a Market Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 1, 8-10 (Christopher Clague and Gordon C. Rausser
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The legal measures that should be taken during the early phase
of the transition would at the very least support at least a "minimum
bang." These include: (1) tax codes and regulations, with accompanying rules and tax collection mechanisms; (2) a foreign investment law
that encourages the entry of foreign capital; (3) labor laws that
provide for freedom of hiring of labor and provide continued worker
security in old age and disability; (4) legislation establishing a
minimum social safety net; and (5) legislation that continues to
guarantee free education and limited health care.'36 To the extent
that some of these crucial legal changes could not be completed
during the pre-constitution period, they should be finalized after the
new constitution is-enacted.
The rest of the economic reform legislation to be passed in the
post-constitution period will depend on the economic program that is
adopted. Many of the law changes enumerated below will be an
integral part of any economic reform program.
B. Development of a Legal Framework for a Free-Market in Cuba
Many laws need to be enacted during the post-constitution period
to provide an adequate legal framework for a free-market, democratic
society in Cuba. These include, among others, the following new or
revised laws and codes:
1. Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting, and Auditing Laws
2. Administrative Law
3. Aliens, Nationality, and Immigration Laws
4. Armed Forces and National Defense Laws
5. Banking Law
6. Civil Law
7. Commercial Law
8. Customs Law
9. Education Law
10. Election Law
11. Environmental Law
12. Judicial Reform Law
13. Insurance Law
14. Land Use Law
15. Maritime and Fisheries Laws
16. Mining Law
eds., 1992); see also, Perez-Lopez, supra note 133, at 405.
136. Although, as noted above, this social safety net is currently unraveling due to the
ongoing economic crisis, at least some of its elements must be preserved during the transition
to avoid extreme hardship on the population and avoid civil unrest. Mesa-Lago, supranote 21,
at 652-54.
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Penal Law
Occupational Health and Safety Law
Public Contracts Law
Public Employees Law
Securities Law

22. Social Security Law
23. Telecommunications Law

24. Transportation Laws

This partial enumeration of the new laws that need to be enacted
during the transition serves to illustrate the daunting legislative task
that lies ahead for the transition government. Further, it is vitally
important that the transition government develop the legal infrastructure to support the drafting, public debate, approval, and implementation of all of this legislation as quickly as possible.
Several of these laws, such as the new Commercial Code and the
Election Law, can and probably should be passed before the new
constitution is enacted. Others, such as the new banking laws, may
be enacted early but may not be capable of full implementation for
several years (if the experience in Eastern Europe serves as a
guide)." Cuba's current financial system is totally inadequate for
commercial or individual use, so its rebuilding will have to start from
a "quasi zero" base and may not be accomplished in the first few
years of the transition.'38

137. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supranote 96, at 31-34. Jan Svejnar & Jorge Perez-Lopez
observed the following about the transformation of banking law in Eastern Europe:
All Central and East European economies have attempted to convert the traditional
'monobank' system into one with an autonomous central bank and a competitive
commercial bank sector. The attempt has succeeded on paper, but in practice has so
far been a resounding failure. The newly created commercial banks have usually
rapidly emerged from branches of the former central bank, but this transformation has
been more de jure than de facto. The commercial banks are undercapitalized, they
lack capable professional staff (including loan officers), and the bulk of their assets has
been loaned to bankrupt enterprises. The banks provide poor financial services, and
their loan activity is frequently oriented toward state enterprises at the expense of new
private firms.
Jan Svejnar & Jorge Perez-Lopez, A Strategy for the Economic Transformationof Cuba Based
on the East European Experience in CUBA AFrER THE COLD WAR 323,330-31 (Carmelo MesaLago ed., 1993).
138. Alberto Luzarraga, Anticipating the New Cuba Financial Structure, Address at the
Anticipating the New Cuba Conference (March 17-18, 1994) (transcript available in the Shaw,
Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge library, Washington D.C.). It should be noted that the Cuban
Banking Study Group (CBSG), a U.S.-based group of Cuban-American banking experts, was
organized in 1992 to study banking reform requirements during Cuba's transition. See Fernando
A. Capablanca, Cuba: Elements for a Modern Financial System, Address at The Fourth Annual
Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (August 12, 1994) (transcript
available in Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge's Library, Washington D.C.). Hopefully, the
efforts of groups such as the CBSG will result in proposals for expediting the development of
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Implementation of changes in other areas of the law may be
delayed due to economic necessity. For example, Cuba, like virtually
all the former communist countries in Eastern Europe, suffers from
the absence of a true governmental commitment to protecting the
environment, a lack of enforcement of existing environmental laws,
and the press of financial constraints. These problems have caused a
growing environmental crisis in Cuba which will call for legislative
remedies during and after the transition? 39
The transition government in Cuba will surely recognize the need
for the swift enactment and enforcement of environmental protection
laws and regulations."4 Alternatively, there will be significant
pressure on the government to facilitate economic reconstruction by
increasing the output of industries, such as sugar production, whose
operations have serious environmental impacts through the use of
chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. 41 There. will also be
pressure to encourage foreign investment by minimizing environmental requirements and liabilities along with opposition to devoting
limited governmental resources to environmental reclamation projects. 42 As a result of the clash between these conflicting needs it
a viable financial system in Cuba.
139. JOSE R. ORO, TI POISONING OF PARADISE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN CUBA
8-13 (1992); see generally Maria Dolores Espino, EnvironmentalDeteriorationand Protectionin
Socialist Cuba, in ASCE-2, supranote 1, at 327. Recent reports indicate that the environmental
degradation that is taking place in Cuba is severe and may take many years to reverse.
Francisco Garcia Azuero, Cuba's Environmental Damage Will Take Years to Fix, Some Fear,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 18, 1994, at 12A.
140. Cuba's current government has enacted several laws and decrees towards the protection
of the environment, starting with the Law on Environmental Protection and the Rational Use
of Natural Resources (Law No. 33, published January 10, 1981) and including (among others)
the Legislative Decree on the Structure, Organization and Operation of the National System for
Environmental Protection and the Rational Use of Natural Resources (Legislative Decree
No. 118, published January 18, 1990), the Decree on the Protection, Use and Conservation of
Soils (Decree No. 179, published February 26, 1993), the Legislative Decree on Forest and
Wildlife Natural Resources (Legislative Decree No. 136, published March 5, 1993), and the
Legislative Decree on Surface Waters (Legislative Decree No. 138, published July 2,1993). This
legislation, however, is not self-executing, and implementing regulations have not been issued.
Moreover, Cuba's environmental protection agency, the National Commission on the Protection
of the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources (COMARNA), has a staff of
only two dozen people, lacks enforcement powers, and is unable to take action against stateowned enterprises. Espino, supra note 139, at 339-40; ORO, supranote 139, at 9-13.
141. Espino, supra note 139, at 340.
142. Former socialist countries, notably Eastern Germany, are slowly beginning to curb
further environmental deterioration and reverse the effects of environmental abuses under
socialism. New environmental protection legislation (such as the Environmental Framework Act
in Eastern Germany) includes clean-up obligations on entities causing environmental damage
and their legal successors. DAVID E. BIRENBAUM, BusINEss VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE
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is quite possible that comprehensive environmental legislation may
not be implemented until several years into the transition when the
economy has stabilized and recovery is on its way.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Changes to Cuba's legal institutions must be at the core of a
successful market transition. The Russian and East European reform
experiences provide examples of the risks of attempting a transition
without a sufficient framework of laws, institutions, and trained
personnel to implement the changes. 43 Moreover, in light of the
widespread disregard for the law that has developed in Cuba as a
result of the deterioration of living conditions, it is essential that a
strong legal system be developed to re-instill in the population
sufficient respect for the laws necessary for true democracy. 4
The transition government in Cuba will have its hands full
keeping order in the country and preventing a major economic
disaster. Enacting the needed legislation and instituting the necessary
changes to the legal system in a short time frame may be too difficult
a task for such a government to accomplish without outside help. It
will likely be only through the combined efforts of legal professionals
in Cuba and abroad that required changes to Cuba's legal system will
be accomplished on a schedule that supports the transition. Since
there are political limitations on the work that lawyers in Cuba will
be able to accomplish, the impetus for anticipating and defining the
changes must at this time come from abroad.
Consequently, a group of U.S.-based lawyers, working on a pro
bono basis, should study the changes that will need to be implemented in Cuba's legal system. In light of current conditions in Cuba, such
a group should start work immediately. 4

AND RussiA § 6.03, at 6-28 (2d ed. Supp. 1994). Enactment of similar legislation in Cuba would
act as a disincentive to foreign investment, because it would subject those taking control of
former state-owned enterprises to potential liability for the costs of cleaning up the areas
affected by previous operation of the facility and disposing of toxic materials that may have
accumulated.
143. BmENBAUM, supra note 142, at § 2.01, at 2-6 & n.3 ("Legal uncertainty is consistently
cited first among the most significant barriers to investing in Russia.").
144. Again, the example of the current Russian situation is instructive. It is widely reported
that crime and corruption have increased since the collapse of the Soviet Union, partly because
there was a widespread disregard for the law in Soviet society and insufficient steps were taken
to re-establish a strong and effective legal system. Id. at 2-10.
145. It is not desirable, however, to actually draft proposed legislation for a new Cuba. First,
it would be presumptuous on the part of lawyers abroad to substitute themselves for the
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transitional government in Cuba in assessing the needs of the nation. Second, drafting laws from
abroad for a transition in Cuba might give the Cuban government another opportunity to
denounce the political designs of Cuban exiles. Third, most Cuban American (and American)
lawyers have been trained in the U.S. legal system, which is vastly different from Cuba's
previous and current systems. Finally, laws cannot be drafted in a vacuum, but must respond
to the actual conditions at the time of their enactment.

